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ABSTRACT
Vulnerabilities in private networks are difficult to detect for attack-
ers outside of the network. While there are known methods for
port scanning internal hosts that work by luring unwitting internal
users to an external web page that hosts malicious JavaScript code,
no such method for detailed and precise service identification is
known. The reason is that the Same Origin Policy (SOP) prevents
access to HTTP responses of other origins by default.
We perform a structured analysis of loopholes in the SOP that can
be used to identify web applications across network boundaries. For
this, we analyze HTML5, CSS, and JavaScript features of standard-
compliant web browsers that may leak sensitive information about
cross-origin content. The results reveal several novel techniques,
including leaking JavaScript function names or styles of cross-origin
requests that are available in all common browsers.
We implement and test these techniques in a tool called COR-
SICA. It can successfully identify 31 of 42 (74%) of web services
running on different IoT devices as well as the version numbers of
the four most widely used content management systemsWordPress,
Drupal, Joomla, and TYPO3. CORSICA can also determine the patch
level on average down to three versions (WordPress), six versions
(Drupal), two versions (Joomla), and four versions (TYPO3) with
only ten requests on average. Furthermore, CORSICA is able to
identify 48 WordPress plugins containing 65 vulnerabilities.
Finally, we analyze mitigation strategies and show that the pro-
posed but not yet implemented strategies Cross-Origin Resource
Policy (CORP) and Sec-Metadata would prevent our identification
techniques.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy→Web application security; Network
security; Browser security; • Computer systems organization
→ Embedded systems; Redundancy; Robotics; • Networks →
Network reliability.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Network segregation remains a cornerstone of Internet security
as it often separates insecure services within private networks (In-
tranet) from the public Internet. For example, a firewall acts as
a network perimeter that filters packets between both networks,
often in a way that outgoing connections are allowed and incom-
ing connections blocked. Setups with network address translation
(NAT ) commonly show this behavior. Administrators focus on se-
curing Internet-facing services but often treat Intranet applications
with minor importance. In consequence, Intranet applications are
often not patched with the latest security updates or use insecure
configuration settings. This leads to situations where Intranet ap-
plications may contain well-known vulnerabilities that are easy to
exploit using common attack frameworks [27, 33]. Exploits against
web applications play a unique role here because attacks like Cross-
Site Request Forgery (CSRF), Cross-Site Scripting, or SQL Injection
can be used to cross perimeters. For example, a web attacker can
create an Internet website containing exploits and lure unsuspecting
users within the private network to visit that page. The victim’s
browser then attacks a target within the private network.
From a web attacker’s viewpoint, she has the problem of learning
detailed information about the victim’s network in order to perform
such an attack successfully. At which IP/port within the private
network runs a vulnerable web application with known exploits?
There are known attacks that randomly try known exploits
against IP addresses in private networks [18, 22], which is effec-
tive for compromising many random hosts but is not suitable for
targeted attacks. While it is known to be possible to perform port
scans in a cross-origin fashion using JavaScript [10], there is no
such method to learn detailed information about web applications
like type and version. Existing web service identification tools do
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Figure 1: Simplified STUN process: A client behind a NAT sends a STUN request to a STUN server and receives its Internet-
facing IP address in response.
not work from browsers and across origins. This information short-
age about the victim’s network makes targeted attacks against web
applications in private networks difficult.
This leads to our main research question: Is it possible to perform
precise web service identification across network perimeters that use
standard browser functionality and that work across origins?
We perform a structured analysis of standard-conforming CSS,
HTML5, and JavaScript functionality and introduce several tech-
niques that can be used to create unique identifiers of web appli-
cations and that work across origins. These identifiers are used to
query a database of known identifiers to learn the type and version
of web applications.
We implemented the proposed techniques in a tool called COR-
SICA1 and measured its effectiveness against a testbed of widely
used web services and different IoT services. The analysis shows
that CORSICA can successfully detect the type and version of web
applications running on 250 IoT devices, 122 different versions
of content management systems, and 48 WordPress plugins with
known, remotely exploitable vulnerabilities.
In summary, we make the following contributions in this paper:
• We present novel techniques that allow identifying web-
based services using standard browser features and that
work cross-origin (Section 4).
• We describe a method to automatically learn feature vectors
for identifying a web-based service (Section 5).
• We implement the techniques in a tool called CORSICA and
show that it can successfully identify 154 out of 250 tested
IoT systems running web applications. It can identify patch
level versions of content management systems on average
down to three versions (WordPress), six versions (Drupal),
two versions (Joomla), and four versions (TYPO3) as well as
48 out of 600 WordPress plugins containing known remotely
exploitable vulnerabilities (Section 6).
• Finally, we discuss possible strategies that prevent the pre-
sented identification techniques (Section 7).
2 BACKGROUND AND RELATEDWORK
In its current state, the Internet is not a single large network of
devices, it rather is a collection of multiple smaller networks and
devices. Smaller networks are often encapsulated and cannot be
directly reached from the outside. However, collaboration in the
form of resource sharing between services on different devices and
networks is a desired feature of the Internet. While these features
1https://github.com/FHMS-ITS/CORSICA
are commonly used by many web services for collaboration, they
allow a non-negligible attack surface if implemented insecurely.
2.1 Perimeter Security
Today, services on private and corporate networks are usually hid-
den behind a perimeter in the form of firewalls or Network Address
Translators (NATs). While firewalls actively protect services from
external access by blocking specific ports and traffic, NATs usually
provides the same feature passively.
NAT was standardized in the 1990s by the IETF [9] in response to
concerns about the exhaustion of the available IPv4 address space.
While the Internet was initially designed with the assumption that
every device with access to the Internet has its own IP address, NAT
enables the reuse of specific address blocks for internal networks.
NAT boxes enable this reuse by translating internal IP addresses
to a single Internet-facing IP address, effectively blocking direct
access to devices on the internal networks from the Internet.
Nevertheless, it is possible to learn certain information about the
network using JavaScript inside a browser in a NAT environment.
For example, a malicious website can perform network scans re-
vealing available hosts as well as, to a certain extent, open ports. An
example of this is pingjs by Jonathan Frederic [10] that uses onload
and onerror events inside JavaScript to discover hosts inside the
network. Furthermore, as NAT breaks desired functionality of the
Internet (e.g., peer-to-peer connections between clients on different
networks), several workarounds, called NAT traversal strategies,
have been proposed. One of these proposals are the Session Traver-
sal Utilities for NAT (STUN, see Figure 1). STUN requires a STUN
server outside of the internal network of a client. First, the client
sends a STUN request to the server. As the client is located behind
NAT, its internal IP address is translated to the Internet-facing IP
address before it reaches the STUN server. The STUN server then re-
turns a STUN response containing the contacting public IP address
to the client [28]. Additionally, if STUN is used from JavaScript,
the browser will provide the internal IP address to the JavaScript
context.
2.2 Same-Origin Policy in Browsers
The Same-Origin Policy (SOP) restricts the interactions of scripts
between different origins. This means that the resource access
between these origins is restricted [23]. Examples for resources are
images, scripts, styles, or frames. Netscape introduced the SOP in
1995 alongside JavaScript and the Document Object Model (DOM)
[40]. Interaction of web resources from multiple origins is also
called cross-origin access. In general, the SOP allows to request and
embed resources from other origins. However, it forbids read access
to, and interaction with the content received from another origin.
Even though the SOP has been a staple of web security for many
years, to this day, it is not formally defined and not implemented
consistently in different browsers [29].
As described above, embedding resources like images, style
sheets, and even whole pages into a website is typically allowed.
For websites, it is necessary to access some information about the
embedded cross-origin resource to place them correctly inside their
DOM. Therefore some information must be made available. For
example, a script running in the origin attacker.org can request a
picture from the origin target.org. Therefore attacker.org can embed
it into her own DOM and can read the dimensions of the image to
format the website accordingly. However, it cannot interact with
the actual contents of the response, including access to any pixel
data of the image [23].
2.3 Cross-Site Request Forgery
Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) is a type of attack against web
applications that exists since the 1990s but got its name in 2001 from
Peter Watkins. CSRF attacks trick a user into performing actions of
an attacker’s choosing by leveraging the victim’s browser [8]. For
example, an unassuming user’s browser that is lured onto a website
controlled by an attacker could be tricked into making a request
to their webmail provider trying to install a filter to forward all
e-mails to the attacker. Assuming the victim is logged into their
webmail account, the victim’s browser sends the session cookie
with the attacker’s request, and the requested filter is applied. This
exact attack was performed against Gmail in 2007 [26].
CSRF attacks are possible because modern web applications or
websites are often required to be able to send HTTP requests to any
network address. This ability, however, allows an attacker that con-
trols a website visited by the victim’s browser to use resources not
otherwise under her control. These resources include leveraging
the browser state (e.g., by using authentication cookies to perform
privileged actions under the victim’s identity) and network connec-
tivity (e.g., accessing network resources behind a perimeter such as
a firewall) [5]. A common defense mechanism against CSRF attacks
are so-called CSRF tokens that are bound to a victim’s session and
need to be sent with every request made. Only if the token can be
correctly verified, the requested action is performed [5].
2.4 Related Work
Substantial work on identifying Internet-reachable services was
done in the past, and in the following, we survey work related to
our approach. Konzina et al. collected characteristic information on
web applications in 2009 by identifying linked applications-internal
URLs and forms [19]. However, their tool requires the attacker to
be on the same network to conduct a scan.
Acar et al. analyzed web-based attacks against local IoT devices
behind NATs using a malicious website [1]. Their work mainly
relies on circumventing the same-origin policy by exploiting HTML
MediaErrors and DNS rebinding in web browsers. Their attack will
not work with most modern browsers, because they do not generate
MediaErrors anymore [2, 13]. Furthermore, DNS Rebinding to
local IP addresses is blocked by many modern home routers [3, 25],
making this technique unreliable. Compared to this, CORSICA
stays within the borders of the SOP and thus does not rely on DNS
rebinding.
Stamm et al. presented attacks using a malicious web page to de-
tect and manipulate home routers [31]. The authors build upon this
to allow access to the internal network by reconfiguring the victim’s
DNS server and using these attack vectors to persist. The limita-
tions presented in their work, however, do not allow for generic
fingerprinting of Intranets.
Additionally, much work was done on fingerprinting JavaScript
files. In 2012, Blanc et al. described a procedure to characterize ob-
fuscated JavaScript using abstract syntax trees [7]. Even though this
would also help fingerprint non-obfuscated JavaScript files, such
a technique would require unrestricted access to the source code,
which is prevented by the SOP. In 2008, Johns documented state-of-
the-art techniques in JavaScript malware [17]. More specifically, he
presented readable attributes for cross-origin resources that are dy-
namically loaded on a website. CORSICA builds upon and extends
these loopholes in the SOP to build a web-based fingerprinter and
scanner for networks across perimeters.
In 2015, Frederic published a JavaScript-based ping script pingjs
on GitHub [10]. To determine if a host on the network is online, an
img element is created, and the resource URL is set to the IP address
of the host. The onload and onerror events [38, 39] of the image
element are used in conjunction with a timeout to determine if the
host is up. In March 2019, Bergbom published a research report
regarding the described attack scenario. It uses similar techniques
but is limited to one media type: images [6].
Subtle differences in HTML pages were found to not only leak
information about type and version of the web application but may
also correlate with confidential information that is leaked through
a storage-based side channel [11].
It is well-known that using JavaScript enables a website or web
service to fingerprint the user’s web browser using several tech-
niques [34]. As these fingerprinting techniques target the web
browser of the user, it raises privacy concerns about enabling user
tracking. These techniques rely – among other aspects – on the
fact that every browser interprets styles and scripts differently.
In the case of this work, this browser-specific behavior is rather
obstructive and complementary to our goals.
3 ATTACKER MODEL AND OVERVIEW
The goal of the attacker we consider in this paper is to attack
web services that are hidden behind security perimeters, e.g., on
private networks behind firewalls or NAT devices. To gain access
to this network, the attacker lures unwitting users located within
the private network to visit an attacker-controlled Internet website.
We assume that the victim uses a standards-compliant web browser
that executes the JavaScript code from the attacker’s website. The
browser strictly adheres to the Same-Origin Policy when executing
the JavaScript code.
For service identification, the attacker needs to scan the private
network and identify the type and possibly version of web services.
This information is key to find known security vulnerabilities that
can be exploited to conduct the actual attack. The winning con-
dition is reached when the attacker learns detailed information
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Figure 2: The architecture of the cross-origin web service identification tool CORSICA.
about the type, version, port, and IP address of a web service that
has known security vulnerabilities but is hidden behind a security
perimeter. Note that the actual attack against this web service after
identification is out of scope for this work.
Figure 2 shows the overall process we follow in this paper. At
first, CORSICA queries a testbed of web applications with known
security vulnerabilities to generate feature vectors. Those feature
vectors are built into a classification engine that is published in a
JavaScript-based attacker website on a public webserver. When a
client inside the network visits the page, CORSICA is executed in
the client’s browser and discovers and identifies existing devices
and applications in the restricted network. CORSICA then exports
a map of discovered and identified services within the restricted
network.
4 IDENTIFYING SERVICES ACROSS
PERIMETERS
Websites often include code and resources into their own DOM, ei-
ther from a content delivery network (CDN) or from other domains.
As described in Section 2.2, this is explicitly allowed by the SOP, as
it prevents Cross-Origin reads but allows the inclusion of code (i.e.,
JavaScript or StyleSheets) and resources (i.e., images or videos).
Although the browser tries to reveal as little information as
possible about a loaded resource, some information is ultimately
necessary. For example, a web page needs to know the width and
height of an included image to format a web page correctly. In other
words, the SOP tries to be just permissive enough not to break
benign features of the web. However, these pieces of information
combined allow the precise identification of services.
4.1 Loopholes in the SOP
When a website loads resources, it can define multiple JavaScript
handlers, particularly onload and onerror. Those handlers are de-
signed to serve information to JavaScript concerning the loading
state and if a loading error has occurred. In most cases, this informa-
tion is not passed to JavaScript for cross-origin requests. However,
this behavior is inconsistent for different browsers and resource
types. While these events are essential to render websites embed-
ding external image files, they are usually not relayed for arbitrary
media files like PDF files and websites loaded in frames. This is to
prevent a website from checking the existence of these files across
origins. As shown in Table 1, the vast majority of accessible files
within web services are JavaScript, Style Sheet, or image files.
Table 1: File types within web services inside our database.
Filetype Number of files
.php: 1792301
.gif: 657480
.png: 434389
.js: 380695
.css: 152453
.yml: 146461
.html: 144020
.rst: 135629
.xml: 81685
.svg: 71222
Images. Although pixel data is generally not available2, the im-
age dimensions are crucial for correct formatting. Thus, the width
and height of an image are always available across origins. This
information allows checking the presence of an image as well as
distinguishing between two images with identical file paths but
different dimensions.
Cascading Stylesheets. Even though the content of a style sheet
is not directly available to the embedding document, it is impossible
to hide the formatting from the embedding web page. Thus, after
applying a style to an object in the DOM, the resulting attributes
can be read. As a result, the embedding website can reconstruct a
loaded style sheet to a considerable extent.
2This also includes functions on the image, e.g. filters, as they are known to reveal
information about the image data [14, 32].
Figure 3: Features representing a style sheet, a JavaScript and an image file from the CMS: Wordpress and TYPO3
The example style sheet directive displayed in Figure 3 defines
directives for an element with the id wp-members. Information on
the directive can be accessed to some extent by including the style
sheet into an HTML page and creating an element with the id
wp-members. After creation, the browser will automatically apply
the style values to the elements under the condition that the style
sheet was loaded correctly. In this specific case, we would expect
the browser to set the color attribute to #1982D1. Fortunately, we
are allowed to read those style values from any element we have
createdwith JavaScript using the function getComputedStyle. This
function returns the value of a specific style attribute the browser
has applied to an element. The applied values can be compared
with the expected results to determine if a style sheet file is present
on the device and contains the expected directives.
JavaScript. Remote JavaScript is necessarily accessible as if it
was loaded from the same origin (with some restrictions regarding
the visibility of syntax errors). Although variables and functions
cannot be listed via JavaScript, their existence can be checked.
Furthermore, the values of defined variables can be read, and the
embedding script can call functions. Lekies et al. [21] described
attacks based on this.
Including a <script>-tag into an HTML page with the source
attribute directing to the JavaScript file to be checked makes all
functions and global variables accessible from a global context. Ad-
ditionally, the output of functions or operations inside a JavaScript
file is precalculated where possible. As a result, the presence of
functions and variables as well as their value can be checked using
JavaScript. Interestingly, calling .toString() on a function even
returns the source code, including comments [24].
Other Resources. Websites can also embed other types of media
files, for example, audio and video files. For videos, the dimen-
sions (.videoHeight and .videoWidth) and duration is available
(.duration).
4.2 Web-based Service Identification
Each service is identified by a set of files (i.e., features). A single
feature consists of one or more subfeatures. Subfeatures represent
actual attributes that can be extracted from a file and are necessary
to identify the file using the techniques described in Section 4.1.
Figure 3 shows example features representing a CSS, a JavaScript,
and an image file.
Once the feature vectors are generated, they can be used to
identify a service using JavaScript. To achieve this, a process based
on the decision tree shown in Figure 4 is used. At every node of
the tree, a single feature of a service group is checked, and the next
node is chosen according to the result. This will be repeated until
a leaf node is reached, and the service is identified as uniquely as
possible.
The process to check a single feature is described in Figure 5. To
check a single feature, an HTML-Element corresponding to the file
type is created on the test page: <script> for JavaScript, <link>
for CSS, and <img> for images. In the next step, the src attribute of
the created element is set to the URL of the file to identify. When it
is loaded, the techniques described in Section 4.1 are used to identify
the file. For images, the image size is checked and, for JavaScript,
all expected variables and functions are checked for their existence.
For style sheets, there is an additional step to be done. Here we need
to add test elements to our test page that can be formatted to check
the directives. Those test elements must have the right class or id
and the correct type. Once a test element is created, we can observe
if the test element is formatted as expected. This can be done by
Figure 4: Example identification tree. A single path in
the tree identifies a service uniquely. Each node repre-
sents a feature (file), for which the value can be tested
by checking the subfeatures.
Figure 5: Diagram of the identification process for fea-
tures for each file type.
using the JavaScript function getComputedStyle or the attribute
currentStyle, depending on the browser used. After checking a
directive, the element is removed, and a new test element is created
to prevent the page from slowing down due to excessive amounts
of elements. After all subfeatures of a feature are tested, the created
element from the beginning is removed from the test page.
5 LEARNING SERVICE FEATURE VECTORS
Before identifying web-based services across perimeters, feature
vectors need to be collected. This step is necessary because the
attacker needs to know which features to collect and which vectors
to compare the collected feature vectors to. In this section, we
describe the offline setup phase of the identification process.
5.1 Creating a Service Corpus
Files containing usable attributes for service identification can be
retrieved using three different approaches depending on the avail-
ability of the needed data: (1) using the installation files of a service,
(2) using a firmware image of a device, or (3) crawling an online
installation. As not all approaches are possible for every service,
we made sure that the output of the three approaches is compatible,
and that the results can be combined.
Installation files of Services. Obtaining installation files of a ser-
vice is often possible from the vendor’s or distributor’s web page.
After downloading and unpacking, we use the obtained files for the
feature vector generation.
Firmware Images of Devices. Firmware images of IoT devices of-
ten contain Linux based file systems and can be unpacked to access
the files. If the downloading and unpacking part is successful, we
can find the root directory of the web server and extract all relevant
files, while preserving the directory paths as well as the real web
path relative to the webroot on the device. This approach neverthe-
less has a couple of caveats. First, not all firmware images can be
successfully unpacked. Second, many vendors do not provide public
access to their firmware images but implement an automated up-
date process on the individual embedded devices. This complicates
access to those images.
Crawl Online Installations. The third approach uses a crawler to
obtain the relevant files from live systems. We initialize the crawler
with the IP address and the port of a running web service or the
web interface of a target device. Starting at the index page of the
web service or interface, the crawler tries to find all relevant files
accessible from the crawler’s position. Those can be, for example,
linked in the HTML files as well as inside JavaScript and style
sheet files served by the server. The downside of this approach is
that the number of files the crawler can access is limited to files
linked in publicly accessible documents. In some cases, relevant
files are publicly accessible, but only pages inside protected areas
link to them, which the crawler cannot reach. This results in weaker
feature vectors in comparison to those generated by the first two
approaches.
5.2 Extracting Feature Vectors
After creating the service corpus, we can begin to generate feature
vectors, as described in subsection 4.2.
An image file is represented by a feature divided into two sub-
features – the attributes width and height. This information can be
extracted using image processing libraries.
JavaScript and CSS files result in more than two possible sub-
features as such files offer more attributes we can access from
JavaScript. To extract the subfeatures from those files, we use a
parser. While extracting subfeatures for style sheets, we have to
consider the different types of possible style definitions, such as
defining attributes for all elements of a specific type and elements
with IDs or classes. An example is described in subsection 4.2.
The subfeatures for JavaScript are functions or variables which
are declared and accessible from a global context. Besides a simple
test of an existing function or variable, we can call the toString
function of JavaScript on any defined function with a name to get
the source code, including comments, despite the SOP [24]. The
basis for that can be extracted using the Selenium framework.
The resulting file identification features are combined to feature
vectors. Those feature vectors are used to identify full services or
single service components.
5.3 Tree Construction and Optimization
The construction of feature vectors is only the first step in being
able to identify services efficiently. While every identified IP ad-
dress/port pair could be checked against the whole service corpus,
this process would be slow and error-prone due to varying browser
behavior. Therefore, first, the feature vectors will be normalized
for behavior in different browsers, and after that, a tree will be con-
structed from the normalized corpus to optimize the identification
process.
Normalizing the Feature Vectors. The identification of images
works the same way in every browser. Unfortunately, this does
not apply to JavaScript and style sheet files. The process of file
identification shown in Figure 5 relies on the browser executing
JavaScript or applying style directives and comparing the result
with expected values. However, different browsers will interpret
style sheets as well as JavaScript code differently, and, therefore,
some of the generated feature vectors will not work correctly. Addi-
tionally, JavaScript files sometimes require other JavaScript code to
be executed before to work, i.e., if functions rely on frameworks like
jQuery. To deal with this, we have implemented an automated test
suite based on the Selenium framework [30] supporting Chrome
and Firefox. This test suite uses both browsers to test all available
identification vector from the database against the files in question
and marks all subfeatures that could not be recognized correctly,
constructing normalized feature vectors that can be recognized
in both browsers. Furthermore, this enables us to build separate
feature vectors for each supported browser.
Tree construction. The speed of the identification is crucial, as
it can only run as long as the attacker’s website is open in the
victim’s browser. As a browser only allows a limited number of
parallel requests – mostly between six and ten – the time needed
to identify a device or application is directly related to the number
of required requests. To optimize that number, we use a decision
tree-based approach when identifying services.
To build an optimized tree, we identify service groups from the
corpus that share features, e.g., devices by the same manufacturer
that share a company logo. A service can be part of multiple service
groups as it can share common features with multiple services
that do not necessarily share the same features. Subsequently, we
construct the tree by creating nodes to distinguish between services
designed to split the remaining services in half with each level of
the tree. Furthermore, the nodes are sorted by the frequency of
services to increase the probability of traversing the tree faster. The
resulting tree contains all services in the corpus. However, not all
can be identified uniquely – i.e., are represented by a leaf node in
the tree – because some service groups are indistinguishable by the
extracted features.
Figure 6 shows an example of the path used to identify TYPO3
version 4.7.6. Each node represents a feature and therefore, a file re-
quested by our test page. The first requested path is wp-includes/
js/crop/cropper.js, which does not exist for TYPO3 v. 4.7.6. The
second path is btn-sprite.gif, which exists. The numbers in each
node denote the number of possible device versions left. The last
requested path is SearchField.js, which exists and thus identifies
TYPO3 version 4.7.6.
Optimizing the Identification Process. We distinguish between
two identification processes: The full service identification and the
component identification. The full service identification has exactly
one result, while the component identification can lead to multi-
ple independent results as an application can consist of multiple
components (i.e., plugins). For the full service identification, the
number of requests necessary to identify a service is critical.
6 EVALUATION
As described in Section 3, the goal of the attacker is to identify
services on restricted networks. Based on this attacker model, we
evaluate our approach on different IoT devices as well as several
Content Management Systems (CMS). Furthermore, we analyzed
how the approach performs in identifying parts of a composite
service, in this case, WordPress plugins.
6.1 Identification of IoT Devices
Some IoT devices run web services, for example, for configuration
purposes. Furthermore, they regularly provide security-critical ser-
vices and often contain critical security vulnerabilities. Some IoT
devices are thus easy to attack once an attacker gains network
access, which is why they are often hidden behind perimeters.
As IoT devices regularly run their software stack on specific
hardware and setting up a local test lab with several IoT devices
is expensive and time-consuming. On the other hand, using pro-
ductive private networks as a testbed would raise ethical concerns.
Performing the JavaScript-based identification in the wild means
forcing peoples’ browsers to scan their private networks to identify
available devices. This scan could lead to problems inside their net-
work and may reveal sensitive information about the user’s local
network to us without the user’s knowledge or consent.
We thus decided to use the well-known public database and
search engine Shodan3 to automatically create testbeds of publicly
accessible IoT devices.
The service identification and evaluation process itself has to
take place inside a browser. To verify the process against a large
testbed would require us to initiate every test run in a browser by
hand. Instead, we automated the process by extending the Selenium-
based [30] test suite described in Section 5.2 to perform test runs and
return the results. We split our evaluation process for IoT devices
into two phases.
Phase 1: The first evaluation step is intended to analyze if a
feature vector generated using a crawler matches the specific device
when the resulting vector is used with JavaScript. To achieve this
evaluation, we crawled embedded devices from Shodan, resulting
in a data set of 250 unique feature vectors. These devices were
picked from search results for different Vendors and device types.
For gathering the data set, we used search queries from the format
"<vendor> 200 ok port:’80, 8080, 8081’". After that, we
aggregate these features into feature vectors. The resulting tree
consists of 250 feature vectors.
Our automated Selenium-based test suite then uses this tree
to identify every device that has a feature vector in the database.
We were able to recognize 62% (154 devices) of the 250 devices.
Additionally, 24% (61 devices) were correctly classified, but their
3https://www.shodan.io/
950: wp-includes/js/crop/cropper.js
646: typo3/sysext/t3skin/extjs/images/button/btn-sprite.gif
û
223: typo3/sysext/[…]00000227E36E5862.png
122: typo3/contrib/codemirror/[…]/js/parsescheme.js
67: typo3/sysext/cms/tslib/media/bullets/dots1.gif
39: typo3/sysext/[…]/structure/element_docheader.css
20: typo3/sysext/[…]/module_help_about_module.css
5: typo3/sysext/[…]/sprites/t3skin.css
1: t3lib/js/[…]SearchField.js (TYPO3 v. 4.7.6)
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Figure 6: A path in the decision tree that leads to TYPO3 version 4.7.6. The numbers denote the amount of possible versions
left and the path is the resource to be requested to move forward in the decision tree.
(a) Results of Phase 1
Match # Devices Percentage
Unique 154 62%
Multiple 61 24%
No 35 14%
Total 250 100%
(b) Results of Phase 2
Match # Devices Percentage
Unique 31 74%
Multiple 7 17%
Incorrect 4 9%
Total 42 100%
feature vectors matched multiple devices. Multiple matches happen
when the publicly accessible files of multiple devices are identical –
for example, two device models of the samemanufacturer that share
the same firmware. 14% (35 devices) of the 250 devices could not
be classified; these include 17 devices for which the crawler could
identify no media files, and we thus could not create a working
feature vector.
Phase 2: The second phase evaluates if a feature vector generated
from a device recognizes other devices of the same type running
the same software. To evaluate this, we queried Shodan for devices
serving the same software version and verified them manually to
get at least eight devices of the same device type and firmware
version as a ground truth.
Based on that, we used one of those devices to build a feature
vector. The remaining devices were saved to the database as testing
devices. This enables us to apply the identification process to the
remaining devices using our Selenium-based test suite and report
the results back to the database. Overall, we tested 42 devices out
of which 31 were correctly classified, four vectors failed, and seven
returned correct results but matched multiple devices.
6.2 Identification of Content Management
Systems
To evaluate our techniques against Content Management Systems,
we chose four major systems: WordPress, Drupal, Joomla, and
TYPO3. The resulting data set contains 18 major, 219 minor, and
950 patch level versions.
The results of this evaluation are described in Table 3. Using our
techniques, we were able to extract distinguishable feature vectors
for 100% of the major and minor versions of WordPress, Joomla,
and TYPO3. The identification rate for minor versions of Drupal
only amounts to 12/139 (9%). This is caused by the fact that Drupal
does not have patch level versions for Drupal 5 to 7. For Drupal 4
and 8, which are using patch level versions, the detection rate for
minor version is 11/15 (73%).
Usually, changes in major and minor versions of CMSs results
in different feature vectors, but between patch level versions, there
are no or only small changes to media files. Due to this fact, we
could only distinguish 122 of 950 (13%) precise patch level versions,
because many of these patch level versions are indistinguishable.
We, therefore, also measured the average cluster size of the results,
i.e., the amount of patch level versions that have an identical fea-
ture vector. On average, the cluster size is 3.5, which means that
CORSICA can narrow down the set of possible patch level versions
of a target down to 3 or 4.
As mentioned in Section 5.3, we optimized the identification
process using a tree-based approach. This enables us to perform the
identification within in best case five and worst-case 14 requests.
The average request count is ten requests. To measure how our
techniques perform in real-world like scenarios, we performed the
identification process on installed systems with the feature vectors
learned before. Tools for identifying CMSs and their versions on
the Internet already exist [12, 15]. Unfortunately, most of the tools
available are notmaintained, were build for already deprecated CMS
versions, and are thus unreliable. Therefore, they do not provide
usable ground truth, making the evaluation of the identification
process against real-world systems difficult.
We decided to create a Docker-based WordPress test lab because
WordPress provides well documented official docker images. This
setup contains 46 different versions available on Docker Hub4.
CORSICA can distinguish all major and minor versions of the 46
tested WordPress versions. Additionally, seven versions (15%) can
be identified down to its patch level version.
6.3 Identification of Vulnerable WordPress
Plugins
While searching for vulnerable targets on a network behind a se-
curity perimeter, knowledge about potentially vulnerable plugins
running on a specific service is valuable for the attacker. The most
widely used plugin-based system is Wordpress, which is why we
focused on that. We crawled the WPScan Vulnerability Database5
for plugin versions containing vulnerabilities that are likely to be
exploitable using CSRF. We considered the vulnerability classes
Remote Code Execution (RCE), Cross-Site Scripting (XSS), and SQL
Injection to be CSRF exploitable.
In total, we came up with 600 vulnerable Wordpress plugins. We
also added the last version before the vulnerability was introduced,
all vulnerable versions, and the first non-vulnerable version of a
plugin to our corpus, resulting in 1,814 different plugin versions.
After extracting the feature vectors, CORSICA was able to identify
the existence of 598 of the 600 plugins in a particular Wordpress
installation.
When identifying vulnerable plugin versions down to the minor
versions, we can identify 590 of the collected 1,814 plugin versions.
The relatively poor performance is due to the fact that in many
cases, the vulnerabilities were fixed in the actual plugin logic, but
the security patch did not change files accessible to our techniques.
For 48 plugins, it was possible to precisely determine the versions
before and after a vulnerability enabling an attacker to detect 65
vulnerabilities: 34 Cross-Site Scriptings, 12 SQL Injections, two
Remote Code Executions, and 17 other vulnerabilities.
6.4 Comparison of Feature Types
In Section 4, we identified three main feature types: Images, Java-
Script, and style sheet files. We found that each of these feature
4https://hub.docker.com/_/wordpress/
5https://wpvulndb.com/
types was able to identify different services. To compare the ef-
fectiveness of each feature type, as well as the effectiveness of
combinations, we measured how many CMS versions, as well as
plugin versions, could be identified correctly. Figure 7 shows the
results.
We found that using only images as a metric, as proposed by
John Bergbom [6], yields considerably worse results than utilizing
further metrics. Using images, we were still able to distinguish 169
of the 1,814 plugin versions, but different versions of most of the
Content Management System versions were no longer distinguish-
able. However, using either only CSS or only JavaScript files as
features improves the identification results significantly, already al-
lowing to distinguish 54 and 75 patch level versions of CMS Systems
and 400 and 322 plugin versions.
7 COUNTERMEASURES
In the following, we discuss several countermeasures to prevent
the attacks discussed in this paper.
7.1 Proposed Defenses for Cross-Origin
Information Leaks
Artur Janc surveyed various techniques to mitigate cross-origin in-
formation leakages [16]. He references a broader range of methods,
from which two seem promising to prevent the kind of attack de-
scribed in our paper: Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy and Sec-Metadata.
Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy.Anne van Kesteren and JohnWilan-
der proposed to resurrect the From-Header proposal [35] as Cross-
Origin-Resource-Policy (CORP) [36]. The overall idea of CORP is
that a server defines which origins are allowed to process a resource.
The server does this by sending a from-origin header along with
the requested resource. After receipt, the browser checks if it is
allowed to process the resource, and drops it otherwise.
The aim of the proposal is not to block access to the resource, but
to signal that inclusion might lead to security problems. Since an
attacking website is not able to modify the headers of a requested
resource and the browser is expected to respect the header, CORP
can effectively block the inclusion of resources. Thus, CORP also
effectively prevents the identification process described in this
paper.
Sec-Metadata. Similar to the CORP proposal, the Sec-Metadata
proposal describes a new HTTP header. In this case, the new header
is sent from the client to the server. The header contains additional
information about a request’s origin and enables the server to decide
if it wants to serve the resource or not. Although Sec-Metadata mit-
igates the service identification effectively, the privacy implications
are not clear. Thus, it seems not too far fetched that anti-tracking
plugins may remove the header, similarly to how “referrer-blockers”
remove the referrer header. Thus, Sec-Metadata creates a conflict
between security and privacy, which might hinder adoption.
Both proposals require code changes on the server-side and the
client-side. Users who regularly update their browsers will ben-
efit from the extensions with no additional configuration efforts.
Server administrators are, however, expected to reconfigure their
Table 3: Results of CMS version identification.
CMS Minor versions Patch level Average Cluster Size
Joomla 12/12 (100%) 26/102 (25%) 2.17
Wordpress 31/31 (100%) 55/321 (17%) 3.09
TYPO3 37/37 (100%) 31/285 (11%) 3.61
Drupal 12/139 (9%) 10/242 (4%) 6.05
Total 92/219 (42%) 122/950 (13%) 3.5 ∅
Images CSS JavaScript Images, CSS und Javascript Total
Wordpress 0 36 33 48 321
Plugins 169 400 322 590 1800
Images CSS JavaScript Images, CSS, and Javascript Total
CMS 10 54 75 122 503,00
Plugins 169 400 322 590 1800,00
10
54
75
122
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
CMS
Images CSS JavaScript Images, CSS, and Javascript
169
400
322
590
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
Plugins
Figure 7: Comparison the effectiveness of the three different feature types.
services to use the new mitigations. As the adoption of novel se-
curity features is often slow6, both proposals describe mid or long
term countermeasures.
7.2 General Recommendations
Although the identification process can be mitigated with the de-
scribed standards and procedures, we argue that it becomes increas-
ingly difficult to maintain security perimeters. Furthermore, making
identification more difficult may be the wrong countermeasure, as
the real problem is that devices are vulnerable to CSRF attacks.
Thus, developers and administrators can harden intranet services
against attacks by applying the same care to internal services as
they do with services facing the public internet.
While web origins as a basis for the same-origin policy are de-
fined in RFC 6454 [4], the documentation and standardization of
the same-origin policy by both standardization bodies [37] and
browser vendors [23] is lacking, leading to recurring browser bugs
[29]. Therefore, we like to encourage standardizing committees
and browser vendors to find common ground in unifying the same-
origin policy for a safer web.
8 CONCLUSION
A regular excuse for not securing devices in private networks is
that attackers need to find those devices in the first place, which is
thought to be difficult. We show that this is not true. Our CORSICA
6The Content Security Policy (CSP) was introduced in 2012. Seven years later, 3.4% of
HTTPS sites and 0.4% of HTTP sites of the Alexa’s Top OneMillion websites implement
the CSP [20].
tool is a JavaScript-based scanner that can reliably identify web ser-
vice versions under the assumption that a victim opens a malicious
web site from within the private network. The evaluation shows
that CORSICA can identify IoT devices running a web service, the
four most widely used Content Management Systems and even
vulnerable WordPress plugins with high accuracy.
CORSICA uses techniques that leak information of cross-origin
requests like image dimensions, the existence of certain CSS styles
or JavaScript function names. The Same-Origin Policy implemen-
tations of Mozilla Firefox, Google Chrome, and Apple Safari allow
these techniques, and they cannot be fixedwithout impeding benign
functionality of the web.
Although countermeasures exist, for example, CORP and Sec-
Metadata, not only browsers need to support them, but also server-
side configuration is needed for every web service. Thus, unfortu-
nately, no short term solutions exist, and securing the endpoints
behind perimeters remains the most effective way to thwart attacks.
In this case, attackers can still identify type and version of web ser-
vices, but this information is useless if the service does not contain
any known vulnerabilities.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The authors would like to thank Sebastian Lekis, Arthur Junk, Ben
Stock and Martin Grothe for their valuable feedback and insight-
ful discussions. Christian Dresen was supported by the research
training group “Human Centered System Security’‘, sponsored by
the state of North Rhine-Westfalia. Fabian Ising was supported by
the research project “MITSicherheit.NRW” funded by the European
Regional Development Fund North Rhine-Westphalia (EFRE.NRW).
REFERENCES
[1] Gunes Acar, Danny Yuxing Huang, Frank Li, Arvind Narayanan, and Nick Feam-
ster. 2018. Web-based Attacks to Discover and Control Local IoT Devices. In
Proceedings of the 2018 Workshop on IoT Security and Privacy (IoT S&P ’18). ACM,
New York, NY, USA, 29–35. http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/3229565.3229568
[2] acargu...@gmail.com. 2018. 828265 - MediaError message property leaks cross-
origin response status. https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=
828265.
[3] AVM. 2018. No DNS resolution of private IP addresses. https://en.avm.de/
service/fritzbox/fritzbox-7590/knowledge-base/publication/show/663_No-
DNS-resolution-of-private-IP-addresses/.
[4] A. Barth. 2011. The Web Origin Concept. http://tools.ietf.org/rfc/rfc6454.txt
RFC6454.
[5] Adam Barth, Collin Jackson, and John C. Mitchell. 2008. Robust Defenses for
Cross-site Request Forgery. In Proceedings of the 15th ACM Conference on Com-
puter and Communications Security (CCS ’08). ACM, New York, NY, USA, 75–88.
http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1455770.1455782
[6] John Bergbom. 2019. Attacking the internal network from the public Inter-
net using a browser as a proxy. https://www.forcepoint.com/sites/default/files/
resources/files/report-attacking-internal-network-en_0.pdf.
[7] G. Blanc, D. Miyamoto, M. Akiyama, and Y. Kadobayashi. 2012. Characteriz-
ing Obfuscated JavaScript Using Abstract Syntax Trees: Experimenting with
Malicious Scripts. In 2012 26th International Conference on Advanced Informa-
tion Networking and Applications Workshops. IEEE, Fukuoka, Japan, 344–351.
https://doi.org/10.1109/WAINA.2012.140
[8] Jesse Burns. 2007. Cross Site Request Forgery: An introduction to a common web
application weakness. http://www.isecpartners.com/documents/XSRF_Paper.
pdf
[9] K. Egevang and P. Francis. 1994. The IP Network Address Translator (NAT).
http://tools.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1631.txt RFC1631.
[10] Jonathan Frederic. 2018. pingjs. https://github.com/jdfreder/pingjs.
[11] Felix C. Freiling and Sebastian Schinzel. 2011. Detecting Hidden Storage Side
Channel Vulnerabilities in Networked Applications. In Future Challenges in Se-
curity and Privacy for Academia and Industry, Jan Camenisch, Simone Fischer-
Hübner, Yuko Murayama, Armand Portmann, and Carlos Rieder (Eds.). Springer
Berlin Heidelberg, Berlin, Heidelberg, 41–55.
[12] Daniel Garcia and @ffranz. 2017. Plecost. https://github.com/iniqua/plecost.
[13] gunesacar. 2018. 1450853-MediaError message property leaks cross-origin re-
sponse status. https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1450853
[14] Ruslan Habalov. 2018. Side-channel attacking browsers through CSS3 fea-
tures. https://www.evonide.com/side-channel-attacking-browsers-through-
css3-features/.
[15] Andrew Horton and Brendan Coles. 2010. Whatweb. https://www.
morningstarsecurity.com/research/whatweb.
[16] Artur Janc. 2018. How do we Stop Spilling the Beans Across Origins? https:
//www.arturjanc.com/cross-origin-infoleaks.pdf.
[17] Martin Johns. 2008. On JavaScript Malware and related threats. Journal in
Computer Virology 4, 3 (01 Aug 2008), 161–178. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11416-
007-0076-7
[18] Kafeine. 2015. An Exploit Kit dedicated to CSRF Pharming. https://malware.
dontneedcoffee.com/2015/05/an-exploit-kit-dedicated-to-csrf.html.
[19] Mario Kozina, Marin Golub, and Stjepan Groš. 2009. A method for identifying
Web applications. International Journal of Information Security 8, 6 (29 Aug 2009),
455. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10207-009-0092-3
[20] A. Lavrenovs and F. J. R. Melón. 2018. HTTP security headers analysis of top one
million websites. In 2018 10th International Conference on Cyber Conflict (CyCon).
IEEE, Tallinn, Estonia, 345–370. https://doi.org/10.23919/CYCON.2018.8405025
[21] Sebastian Lekies, Ben Stock, Martin Wentzel, and Martin Johns. 2015. The
Unexpected Dangers of Dynamic JavaScript. In 24th USENIX Security Sym-
posium (USENIX Security 15). USENIX Association, Washington, D.C., 723–
735. https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity15/technical-sessions/
presentation/lekies
[22] Jakob Lell. 2013. Real-World CSRF attack hijacks DNS Server configuration of
TP-Link routers. https://www.jakoblell.com/blog/2013/10/30/real-world-csrf-
attack-hijacks-dns-server-configuration-of-tp-link-routers-2/.
[23] Mozilla. 2017. Same-origin policy. https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/
Web/Security/Same-origin_policy.
[24] Mozilla. 2019. Function.prototype.toString(). https://developer.mozilla.org/en-
US/docs/Web/JavaScript/Reference/Global_Objects/Function/toString.
[25] Netgate. 2018. DNS Rebinding Protections. https://www.netgate.com/docs/
pfsense/dns/dns-rebinding-protections.html.
[26] Petko D. Petkov. 2007. Google Gmail e-mail hijack technique. https://www.
gnucitizen.org/blog/google-gmail-e-mail-hijack-technique/.
[27] Rapid 7. 2019. Metasploit Framework. https://metasploit.com/.
[28] J. Rosenberg, R. Mahy, P. Matthews, and D.Wing. 2008. Session Traversal Utilities
for NAT (STUN). http://tools.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5389.txt RFC5389.
[29] Jörg Schwenk, Marcus Niemietz, and Christian Mainka. 2017. Same-Origin Policy:
Evaluation in Modern Browsers. In 26th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX
Security 17). USENIX Association, Vancouver, BC, 713–727. https://www.usenix.
org/conference/usenixsecurity17/technical-sessions/presentation/schwenk
[30] Selenium. 2018. SeleniumHQBrowser Automation. https://www.seleniumhq.org.
[31] Sid Stamm, Zulfikar Ramzan, and Markus Jakobsson. 2007. Drive-By Pharming.
In Information and Communications Security, Sihan Qing, Hideki Imai, and Guilin
Wang (Eds.). Springer Berlin Heidelberg, Berlin, Heidelberg, 495–506.
[32] Paul Stone. 2013. Pixel Perfect Timing Attacks with HTML5.
https://www.contextis.com/media/downloads/Pixel_Perfect_Timing_Attacks_
with_HTML5_Whitepaper.pdf.
[33] The BeEF Project. 2019. BeEF - The Browser Exploitation Framework. https:
//beefproject.com/.
[34] R. Upathilake, Y. Li, and A. Matrawy. 2015. A classification of web browser fin-
gerprinting techniques. In 2015 7th International Conference on New Technologies,
Mobility and Security (NTMS). Paris, France, 1–5. https://doi.org/10.1109/NTMS.
2015.7266460
[35] Anna van Kesteren. 2012. The From-Origin Header. https://www.w3.org/TR/
from-origin/.
[36] John Wilander. 2018. Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy (was: From-Origin). https:
//github.com/whatwg/fetch/issues/687.
[37] World Wide Web Consortium (W3C). 2010. Same Origin Policy. https://www.w3.
org/Security/wiki/Same_Origin_Policy.
[38] World Wide Web Consortium (W3C). 2018. onerror Event. https://www.
w3schools.com/jsref/event_onerror.asp.
[39] WorldWideWeb Consortium (W3C). 2018. onload Event. https://www.w3schools.
com/jsref/event_onload.asp.
[40] Michael Zalewski. 2012. The Tangled Web: A Guide to Securing Modern Web
Applications. No Starch Press, San Francisco, CA.
